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» Intro [.pdf]
» Authors [.pdf]
» Letter from the Editor [.pdf | html]
» Table of Contents [.pdf]
» Federal Update [.pdf | html]
» State Privatization Update [.pdf | html]
» Tax and Spending Limitations [.pdf | html]
» Emerging Issues
» Social Security Reform [.pdf | html]
» Arctic National Wildlife Refuge [.pdf | html]
» Offshore Outsourcing [.pdf | html]
» Improving Parks Funding and Services with User Fees [.pdf | html]
» Contract Management and Performance [.pdf | html]
» Privatization Going Postal in Japan [.pdf | html]
» Military Housing Privatization [.pdf | html]
» Housing and Land Use [.pdf | html]
» Air Transportation [.pdf | html]
» Surface Transportation [.pdf | html]
» Rail Transportation [.pdf | html]
» Space Travel [.pdf | html]
» Health Care [.pdf | html]
» Water / Wastewater [.pdf | html]
» Corrections [.pdf | html]
» Education [.pdf | html]
» Insurance [.pdf | html]
» Developing Nations [.pdf | html]
» Endnotes [.pdf]
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» Annual Privatization Report 2005
Improving Parks Funding and Services with User Fees
State and federal budget crunches are
causing funding shortfalls in public parks across the nation.
Facilities are deteriorating, maintenance backlogs are increasing,
and budgets are shrinking as funds are shifted to more "vital"
services. To raise revenues for parks while improving recreational
services to visitors, governments should switch from general tax
appropriations to a user-fee funding system.
Greater Fairness
User fees are a more fair way of
financing parks because they ensure that only those that use the
parks and all the facilities they have to offer must pay to maintain
them. By contrast, general tax appropriations tax everyone for
benefits that may only be realized by a relatively small portion of
taxpayers. At the federal level, for example, Californians subsidize
parks in Connecticut and Virginians subsidize parks in Alaska.
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Greater Freedom of Choice
The shift from
general tax revenue to a voluntary fee system provides park visitors
more choice over where their hard-earned dollars are spent and what
they get in return. Under a user fee system, people have the freedom
to enjoy the recreational services offered by the parks, seek
alternative forms of recreation, or simply decide to do without
and find other uses for their money. This enables the park visitor to
vote with his feet and also communicates market demand to the park
manager.
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Better Incentives for Improving Park Management and Visitor Services
This brings us to another point: parks
must be allowed to keep the user fees they collect so that these
revenues may be reinvested in the park where they were collected,
rather than shipped off to state capitols or Washington, D.C. where
they may never be seen again. This allows park managers to more
accurately assess visitor demandto obtain better information
on park visitors' wants and needsand adjust their
spending accordingly. It also provides managers with greater ability
and incentives to respond to those wants and needs.
To this end, Congress established the
Recreational Fee Demonstration Program (Fee Demo) in 1996, which
authorized the National Park Service, Forest Service, Bureau of Land
Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service to experiment with user
fees and stipulated that at least 80 percent of fees collected must
be maintained by the park of origin. The pilot program has been
extended several times, most recently in the omnibus appropriations
measure for FY 2005, which added the Bureau of Reclamation to the Fee
Demo program and continued the program for 10 more years.
A user fee system allows people more
choice over where and how dollars are spent than tax appropriations
and lets them "vote with their feet." This allows the
"market" for recreation to determine necessary services
and projects, not arbitrary decisions by politicians and bureaucrats
or politically driven pork-barrel (or, in this case, "park-barrel")
projects. A funding system driven by supply and park visitor demand,
rather than political aspirations, would not be likely to support
unnecessary or otherwise wasteful projects.
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Eliminating "Park-Barrel" Spending
Under the current system, cost savings
is one of an agency's last considerations because any money
appropriated to the agencies that goes unspent must be returned
to the Treasury. Even worse, since unspent funds imply that an
agency is overfunded, bureaucracies have an incentive to exaggerate
or overestimate their costs in order to maintain an environment of
fiscal crisis sufficient to justify ever-increasing budgets, and
pork-barreling abounds. As Richard J. Ansson, Jr., noted in a 1998
article in the Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law,
"Over the past thirty years, the appropriation of funding for
pet congressional parks and construction projects has diminished
the Park Service's ability to adequately care for its parks."1
Examples of such "political entrepreneurship" include:
A $333,000 "state-of-the-art,"
"environmentally-friendly" outhouse at the Delaware Gap
National Recreation Area in Pennsylvania ("The two-toilet
outhouse has a gabled roof made of Vermont slate, a cobblestone
foundation built to withstand earthquakes, and porch railings made
from quarried Indiana limestone.");
A $1 million outhouse in Glacier Park;
An $8 million civic center in Seward, Alaska [population:
approximately 4,000]; and
Numerous new employee housing units in Yosemite at a cost of
$584,000 per unit.2
Self-sufficient
national parks could realize significant cost savings as the federal
level of the bureaucracy would diminish, allowing managers to devote
more of their valuable time to actually managing parks, and
costly "park-barrel" projects contrary to the interests
of park users (and even conservationists) would not be forced
upon park administrators. The Fee Demonstration Program may be a
vast improvement over decades past, but until the national parks
become completely self-sufficient, expenditure decisions and other
management policies will continue to be based on the preferences of
Congress and special interests, not the average park-going member of
the public.
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Effects on the Poor
Some have voiced concerns that the cost
of self-sufficient, user-fee-supported parks would prevent the poor
from enjoying the nation's natural resources. First of all,
self-sufficient parks would be more efficient, and thus cheaper to
run, than those supported by general tax appropriations.
Self-sufficient parks have inherent
service-maximization/cost-minimization incentives that tax-reliant
parks do not, and the reduction in bureaucracy necessary to
administer funds would keep costs even lower. In addition,
self-sufficient parks would not be forced to embark upon legislators'
pet projects (such as "state-of-the-art" outhouses) that
currently swell the maintenance backlog and often take precedence
over needed visitor services and facilities improvements. Moreover,
critics often ignore that it is the travel costssimply getting
to and from state or national parksthat are cost prohibitive,
not the user fees themselves.
All of this notwithstanding, the poor
could be accommodated by offering "fee-free" days, free
passes for those who volunteer at park sites, or a certain number of
free or reduced-price "first-come, first-served" passes
that would allow people to compete for the passes based on their time
(i.e., queuing up in line) rather than their disposable income.
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Effects on the Environment
Other critics have claimed that
outsourcing or increased reliance on user fees will lead to the
destruction of natural resources and the "Disneyfication"
of the nation's parks. Yet, most people visit parks because
they want to enjoy nature and get away from urban development for a
time. Thus, self-sufficient parks have no incentive to overdevelop.
In fact, they have the best incentives to balance preservation and
recreation.
In addition, overdevelopment concerns
are often overblown. Consider the following:
Less than 5 percent of the nation's land is developed,
and three-quarters of the nation's population lives on 3.5
percent of its land area.3
Over three-quarters of the states have more than 90 percent
of their land in rural uses, including forests, cropland, pasture,
wildlife reserves, and parks.4
Acreage in protected wildlife areas and rural parks exceeds
urbanized areas by 50 percent.5
99 percent of the people visiting Yellowstone stay within
the developed areas, which comprise less than 2 percent of the
park.6
Moreover, a more market-oriented
pricing system would actually help to prevent the depletion of
natural resources by eliminating underpricing. Pricing park services
below market prices (i.e., below those determined by supply and
demand) encourages overuse of facilities and resources. If everyone
is allowed to use the parks essentially without having to bear the
cost of their use, then no one has an incentive to care for or
preserve the park's facilities and natural resources. This
is known by economists as the "tragedy-of-the-commons"
problem.
Some parks, particularly very popular
parks such as Yellowstone, will tend to be more commercialized and
cater to people who demand many services and accoutrements. Others
will appeal to those seeking the "rugged outdoors" and
will show no signs of commercialization.
Put simply, there is no single ideal,
"one-size-fits-all" park mold, despite the efforts of a
top-down bureaucracy to make it so. Such variety offers park
visitors many choices and people will be able to vote their
preferences with their feetand their dollars.
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Double Taxation
One very valid concern, given the
current financing structure of the National Park System, is that the
use of both taxes and user fees constitutes double taxation. "Why
should I have to pay user fees," one might rightly argue, "if
I am already paying taxes to fund the parks?" Why, indeed? As
one senate staffer argued, one of the biggest constituent complaints
regarding the Fee Demonstration Program is that "[t]here has
been no decline in congressional appropriations as a result of Fee
Demo."7
While the double taxation argument is
often espoused by those opposed to user fees, the argument is best
suited to advocates for the elimination of tax funding. Congress
should thus eliminate the practice of double taxation by eliminating
tax appropriations for national parks and forcing the parks to rely
solely on user fees (or other private sources of funds).
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Case Studies
A. New Hampshire
In 1991, New Hampshire passed a law
requiring all of the state's parks to be self-sustaining. By
using a variety of pricing strategies, cutting costs, and entering
into corporate sponsorships to obtain additional funding for
educational programs, the state's park system quickly was able
to generate enough revenue to cover its entire operating budget
of nearly $5 millionand even pay for some capital investment.
After 14 years of self-sufficiency, New Hampshire's parks are
still in solid financial shape.
B. Vermont
State parks have similarly been
self-sustaining in Vermont since 1993. As recently as 13 years
prior, nearly 40 percent of the park system's operating budget
came from general fundsa dramatic change. The parks sustained
themselves through increased fees, downsizing, and marketing
efforts. In addition, concessions from state-owned ski areas now
provide nearly half of the parks' operating budget. While the
ski areas are managed by the state, they are quite profitable and
operate similar to private enterprises. A portion of all park
revenues is set aside in a sort of "rainy-day" fund for
emergency maintenance and periods of poor weather.
C. Texas
Texas state parks took a different
approach to moving toward self-sufficiency when, in 1991, the state
legislature directed the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD)
to become self-supporting and announced that general funds, which
funded half of the department's operating budget, were going to
be cut off by 1994. Faced with this drastic loss of funding from the
state and the prospect of closing a number of parks, the TPWD
developed the entrepreneurial budgeting system (EBS) to
encourage park managers to cut costs and increase revenues. The
EBS offers the managers incentive contracts that establish
performance goals. Managers that beat spending-limit goals, for
example, are allowed to carry a portion of the unspent funds
over to the following year. The program was initially tried in a few
select parks and was so successful that soon most other parks were
clamoring to join in. As a result, the TPWD did not have to close a
single park. The parks no longer receive any general funds from the
state, although they do receive some money from a tax collected on
sporting goods.8
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Conclusion
The mere
implementation of user fees alone will not solve all park funding
problems. Park managers must have incentives to collect and use
them properly as well. To this end, 100 percent of park revenues
collected should be maintained by the park responsible for
collecting the fees so that: 1) parks have the greatest
incentive to collect fees in an efficient manner and 2) those funds
may be reinvested where the parks' patrons, the park visitors,
will actually realize the benefits. In addition, park managers
should have the flexibility to change user fees as visitor
preferences and economic conditions change. Changes may be required
by the year, by the season, by the week, or even by the day, and
regulatory hurdles should not prevent managers from responding
accordingly.
State and national parks hurting from
recent budget cuts should look to user fees as a way to increase
revenues while maintainingand even improvingvisitor
services and facilities. In order to prevent double taxation, as
well as maximize efficiency and improve park managers'
incentives, user-fee funding should be seen as an alternativenot
a supplementto general tax funding. This elimination of the
political process will offer the greatest incentives to both preserve
the nation's parks and provide quality recreation services for
park visitors.
For a more detailed analysis of user
fees as a solution to parks funding, see Reason Policy Study:
"Funding the National Park System: Improving Services and Accountability with User Fees."
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Endnotes
1 Richard J. Ansson, Jr., "Our National ParksOvercrowded, Underfunded, and Besieged With a Myriad of Vexing Problems: How Can We Best Fund Our Imperiled National Park System?" Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, Fall 1998, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/landuse/Vol141/anss.htm.
3 Samuel R. Staley, The Sprawling of America: In Defense of the Dynamic City, Policy Study No. 251 (Los Angeles: Reason Foundation, February 1999), http://www.reason.org/ps251.html.
7 J. Bishop Grewell, Recreation FeesFour Philosophic Questions, PERC Policy Series, Issue Number PS-21 (Bozeman, Montana: Property and Environment Research Center, June 2004), p. 20, http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps31.pdf.
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